Trade, WTO and the environment by William C. Gruben
bank of dallas bank of dallas
southwe s t
e c o n o m
y
federal reserve federal reserve
southwe s t
e c o n o m
y
ISSUE 1J ANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000
HE 1990s WILL GO down in history as the decade of buoy-
ant economic growth in Texas. 1999 was no exception. After
a slow start due to the lingering effects of the Asian crisis, the
Texas economy bounced back in the second half and fin-
ished the year only moderately weaker than in 1998. As
shown in Chart 1, job growth was positive and exceeded the
national average in each year of the decade.
During 2000, Texas exports, particularly of technology-related
products, should accelerate. Although oil and gas prices are hard to
predict, the unexpectedly high prices since March 1999 should pump
up the budgets of Texas drilling companies, which have only recently
begun to add jobs. And, after several strong years, construction activity
has begun to slow. An election year always poses a challenge for
Mexico, but current indicators suggest that the country will maintain its
current economic expansion into 2000 and, thus, will continue to stimu-
late Texas exports and the border economy. Although tight labor mar-
kets will likely restrain Texas job growth, overall these factors sug-
gest that growth in 2000 will be stable to slightly higher than in 1999.
High Oil Prices Providing a Boost
In Texas, we “dance with the one that brung us,” and the energy
industry has been our partner for a long time. While oil and gas pro-
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THEUNSINKABLETEXASECONOMYduction in Texas has declined steadily
since the early 1970s and technology-
related industries are a growing share of
the state’s economy, big swings in oil
prices can still have a significant eco-
nomic impact. As shown in Chart 2,
broad deviations in Texas employment
growth from its trend have correlated
highly with oil price movements.
Dallas Fed economists Stephen
Brown and Mine Yücel estimate that the
state is 75 percent less sensitive to oil
price fluctuations today than it was in
1982.
1 Even with the reduction, how-
ever, the economists estimate that a 10
percent decline in oil prices that is 
perceived to be long-lasting would de-
crease total Texas employment by 0.36
percent. The price of West Texas In-
termediate crude averaged $14.39 per 
barrel in 1998—a 31.2 percent decline
from 1997 after adjusting for inflation.
At the end of 1998, most forecasters be-
lieved oil prices would remain below
$14 per barrel throughout most of 1999.
As shown in Chart 3, both the rig count
and oil and gas extraction employment
dropped sharply from early 1998
through early 1999.
Production cutbacks by OPEC coun-
tries and a pickup in world demand for
oil caused prices to jump beginning in
March 1999, and by year-end the futures
market was suggesting oil would aver-
age about $23 per barrel in 2000. Al-
though the rig count has bounced back,
oil and gas extraction employment is
just beginning to recover. Based on the
Brown/Yücel model, oil price swings
were likely responsible for a significant
portion of the overall slowdown in first
quarter 1999, and if price expectations
hold up, the energy sector will be an
important source of growth in 2000.
Technology-Related Industries
Growing Strongly
As shown in Chart 4, technology-
related industries have been an important
source of strength for the Texas econ-
omy in the 1990s. These industries grew
at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent
from 1990 to 1998, almost twice the rate
of total nonfarm job growth, which av-
eraged 3 percent. The strongest sector
was computer-related services, which
increased at an annual rate of 10.1 per-
cent. The weakest sector was electronic
components including semiconductors,
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Chart 2
Real Oil Price Influences
Texas Job Growth






















SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Department of
Energy; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Chart 3
Oil Industry on the Rebound
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If price expectations
hold up, the energy
sector will be an
important source of
growth in 2000.which increased at an annual rate of
1.4 percent. The semiconductor indus-
try has achieved very high productivity
growth rates; thus, output in this indus-
try has risen at a much faster pace than
employment.
While data from the narrowly de-
fined industries shown in Chart 4 are
not available on a timely basis, the
more broadly defined categories shown
in Chart 5 suggest that the high-tech in-
dustries slowed in the first quarter but
have since shifted into high gear. Ac-
cording to most market experts, the out-
look for semiconductor sales is strong.
Industry contacts say that strengthening
world demand and the introduction of
new products, particularly in communi-
cations, will likely stimulate demand
across a wide range of electronic prod-
ucts in 2000.
Exports Continuing Recovery
A main factor driving the slowdown
and recovery of the high-tech sector in
1998 and 1999 has been fluctuations in
exports due to changing international
conditions. As shown in Chart 6, be-
tween the fourth quarter of 1997 and
the first quarter of 1999 growth in ex-
ports to Mexico slowed and exports to
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Chart 6
Exports Continue to Bounce Back
































NOTES: Data are seasonally adjusted. Euroland includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
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Chart 4
High-Tech Industry
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Chart 5
High-Tech Jobs
Beginning to Pick Up
Employment






















is strong.other Latin American countries, Asia
and Europe declined. The weakening
and rebound have been particularly
acute in chemicals and high-tech prod-
ucts such as electronic equipment and
nonelectrical machinery.
Demand from Mexico is likely to
continue even as that country goes into
an election year. Weak oil prices and
the Russian financial crisis stalled Mex-
ico’s real output in fourth quarter 1998
and first quarter 1999. With a greater
sense of calm in the international mar-
kets and strongly rising oil prices, Mex-
ico bounced back in the second and
third quarters of 1999 (Chart 7 ). As
David Gould highlights in the Novem-
ber/December 1999 issue of Southwest
Economy, Mexico looks much less vul-
nerable to recession than in the years
before previous elections.
2 Subdued 
levels of domestic credit, government
spending and the current account
deficit all bode well for the Mexican
economy going into 2000. The adoption
of a flexible exchange rate has also re-
duced the chance of a currency devalu-
ation and economic crisis. As shown in
Chart 8, the real value of the peso in
November 1999 was low relative to the
average levels prior to past election
year devaluations.
Construction Activity Slowing
Although mortgage rates have eased
slightly, the overall rise in rates since
the end of 1998 has led to a slowing 
in single-family housing permits (Chart
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Chart 7
Mexican Economy Strengthens
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Chart 8
Real Value of the Peso Not
High by Historical Standards
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Mexico looks much 
less vulnerable to
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SOURCE: F. W. Dodge Inc.9). Continued strength in nonbuilding 
activity (Chart 10), however, has kept
overall contract values from slipping
significantly. In 1998, Congress adopted
a slightly different version of the trans-
portation reauthorization legislation, pro-
viding a minimum estimated increase in
federal funding of $700 million per year
for six years for Texas roadways and
bridges. School construction has also
been strong.
Manufacturing, typically interest rate-
sensitive, has been dominated in recent
years by international demand and en-
ergy markets. Despite higher overall in-
terest rates, manufacturing activity has
improved since the second quarter of
1999, even in some of the more interest-
sensitive sectors such as transportation
equipment and the construction-related
industries—stone, clay and glass, fabri-
cated metal products, and lumber and
wood products (Chart 11). The con-
struction-related industries will likely
weaken in the near future if construc-
tion activity continues to soften.
Expansion Likely to Continue in 2000
While strengthening international de-
mand and current high energy prices
should result in increased opportunities
for Texas businesses in 2000, labor mar-
ket tightness should dampen overall job
growth. As Dallas Fed economist Lori
Taylor discusses in the September/
October 1999 issue of Southwest Econ-
omy, many of the large metropolitan
areas of the state have very low unem-
ployment rates and very high rates of
labor force participation.
3 Thus, getting
employment growth in excess of the
working-age population growth (about
2.2 percent for Texas in 1998) will re-
quire gains in net in-migration. This may
be difficult in an environment where 
almost all regions of the nation are ex-
panding strongly.
Recent movements in leading indica-
tors of the Texas economy confirm a
positive outlook for 2000 (Chart 12).
The Texas Leading Index increased
from July to October 1999, with five of
the eight components showing gains. A
slight decline in the Texas inflation-
adjusted export-weighted value of the
dollar (inverted in the index) indicates 
a generally lower international price for
products produced in Texas. A lower
price should help the state’s interna-
tional competitiveness.
A rise in the U.S. leading index sig-
naled continued strength in the U.S.
economy. Gains in permits to drill oil
and gas wells and in the oil price reflect
improvements in the energy industry.
New unemployment claims declined,
suggesting that fewer individuals are
expecting to be unemployed for an ex-
tended period. A stock price index
based on companies with significant
employment in the state declined, but 
it will likely show a pickup in the last
two months of the year. Help-wanted
advertising and average weekly hours
worked signaled some weakness.
A forecasting model based on the
movements in the index suggests that
job growth should slow only slightly in
2000 from the pace set in the second
half of 1999 (Chart 13). Because of the
weakness in the first quarter of 1999,
however, the model predicts that an-
nual employment growth will increase
slightly from 2.2 percent in 1999 to 2.5
percent in 2000. Based on the model’s
past forecasting accuracy, there is only
about a 2 percent chance that employ-
ment will be lower in either April 2000
or October 2000 than it was in October
1999. Thus, the probability is very high
that the Texas economy will remain un-
sinkable for at least another year.
—Keith Phillips
Phillips is senior economist at the San
Antonio Branch of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.   Notes
1 For a more complete description of the detrended employment series
and the relationship between oil prices and the Texas economy, see
“The New Texas Economy,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas South-
west Economy, Issue 1, January/February 1999, p. 5.
2 David Gould, “Can Mexico Weather Its Next Election Cycle?” Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, Issue 6, November/
December 1999, pp. 10–14.
3 Lori Taylor, “The Economics of Prosperity: A Texas Tale,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, Issue 5, September/
October 1999, pp. 1–4.
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NE OF THE new economy’s de-
fining features is faster produc-
tivity growth. The new econ-
omy’s most prominent (and, to
many, most worrisome) feature
is a booming stock market. Of
the new economy’s implications, those
for monetary policy are among the most
controversial.
In this article I discuss productivity
growth—what it is, why it’s important
and evidence that it has recently been
increasing. I also touch on the stock
market and what it’s saying about ex-
pectations for future growth in produc-
tivity. However, the bulk of the article is
devoted to an analysis of the connec-
tion between productivity growth and
monetary policy.
The main conclusion is that, for pol-
icymakers, whether productivity growth
is high or low is less important than
whether productivity growth is rising or
falling. Rising productivity growth
means good times for central bankers. It
means the Federal Reserve can realisti-
cally hope to deliver low unemploy-
ment, rising wages and more rapid out-
put growth, all without any acceleration
in consumer prices. Once productivity
growth stabilizes—even at a high level
—policy choices become more difficult.
The good news is we’re experiencing
faster productivity growth and have rea-
son to believe this faster growth will
continue. Over time, even a small in-
crease in productivity growth can lead
to a huge improvement in living stan-
dards for Americans. Unfortunately, al-
though productivity can keep rising for-
ever, productivity growth cannot. Hence,
we must be prepared for a shift to a less
favorable policy environment. Looking
ahead, the days of low unemployment
without inflation are probably numbered,
even if the days of rapid output growth
and high stock prices are not. The big
challenge will be recognizing the shift in
the policy environment when it occurs.
Productivity Growth
What It Is. When people talk about
productivity, what they usually have in
mind is labor productivity—output per
hour or output per worker. Government
statisticians distinguish among three un-
derlying sources of labor productivity
growth.
The first is increases in the amount 
of plant and equipment per worker. For
example, I recently had an ink-jet printer
installed in my office. It saves me from
having to walk down the hall when I
print something from my computer. It
saves others on the floor from having to
wait for my documents to print. So both
my productivity and that of my col-
leagues have increased.
The second source of productivity
growth is improvements in the quality
of the workforce. One would expect a
workforce with more schooling and
more job experience to be more pro-
ductive, on average.
The final source of productivity
growth is improvements in technology
and in the organization of the produc-
tion process—in other words, better
equipment and better management. The
label economists apply to productivity
gains from this third source is “multi-
factor productivity growth.”
Why We Care. Productivity growth
is important because it is the main de-
terminant of changes in our standard of
living. Chart 1 shows the growth rate of
GDP per capita along with the growth
rate of labor productivity. Note how
growth in GDP per capita tends to rise
and fall in conjunction with growth in
labor productivity.
The most striking feature of the chart
is the big slowdown in both productiv-
ity and per capita GDP growth during
the 1970s. Average annual per capita
GDP growth fell from 2.5 percent in 
the 1950s and 1960s to 1.1 percent in
the late 1970s as productivity growth
slowed from 2.4 percent to 0.5 percent
per year. We don’t yet have a good un-
derstanding of what caused this deteri-
oration.
Although we saw a partial reversal in
the 1980s and early 1990s, it’s only been
since 1995 that labor productivity and
per capita GDP growth have fully re-
covered. Driven by rapid productivity
increases in the high-tech industries,
overall productivity growth is back to
where it was during its post–World War
II golden age.
The timing of the increase in pro-
ductivity growth is noteworthy. Ordi-
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Labor; author’s calculations.emerge from a recession, only to taper
off as the economic expansion matures.
In contrast, the recent increase began
after the economy had been growing
for nearly five years. So, there’s reason
to believe the increase is not just a flash
in the pan.
Irrationally Exuberant?
Productivity and the Stock Mar-
ket. The period of rising productivity
growth since 1995 has been marked by
sharp increases in price/earnings and
price/dividend ratios, suggesting a con-
nection between productivity growth
and the stock market. A connection cer-
tainly has intuitive appeal. For a given
rate of labor force growth, the more
rapid productivity growth is, the greater
the potential growth rates of output,
earnings and dividends. With faster ex-
pected growth in earnings and divi-
dends, people are willing to pay more
for a stock at any given level of current
earnings or current dividends.
1 That’s
why an Amazon.com can have a market
capitalization some 14 times that of
Barnes & Noble, despite never having
earned a profit.
2
Of course, interest rates, inflation
and investors’ risk perceptions also af-
fect stock valuations. However, if all
these other factors are held constant,
high stock market valuations ought to
signal that investors expect rapid pro-
ductivity growth.
Chart 2 shows what happens when
price/earnings and price/dividend ratios
are used to predict productivity growth
in the nonfarm business sector, after
controlling for interest rates, inflation
expectations and employment trends.
3
The chart illustrates that although in-
vestors have been overly optimistic or
overly pessimistic at times, in general
they have done a good job of anticipat-
ing productivity swings. In particular,
recent high and rising stock market val-
uations have been justified, so far, by
high and rising productivity growth.
As of third quarter 1999, investors
were anticipating an additional 60-basis-
point rise in productivity growth—to
3.5 percent—during the coming year.
Hence, current market valuations assume
not just that productivity growth will re-
main rapid but that it will continue to
increase in the year ahead.
Productivity Growth and
Monetary Policy
That productivity growth is high and
may well remain so is extraordinarily
good news; it’s the story that belongs
on the front page with the banner head-
line. But for monetary policymakers,
some more obscure details of the story
are important too.
Is Inflation Dead? Since fourth
quarter 1995, inflation has remained
contained even as output has acceler-
ated and unemployment has fallen to a
30-year low. This performance has led
some commentators to proclaim that in-
flation is dead. Is it true that in the new
economy, with faster productivity
growth, the Fed need no longer worry
about inflation? The answer lies in the
linkages between wages, prices, pro-
ductivity and unemployment.
Chart 3 traces the relationship be-
tween changes in wage growth and the
level of unemployment over the 35
years from 1961 through 1995. Note that
wage growth tends to rise over time
when the unemployment rate is low
and to fall over time when the unem-
ployment rate is high. The critical un-
employment rate is just under 6 per-
cent. Recent experience has been
generally consistent with this historical
relationship. (See the points marked
with triangles.) As Alan Greenspan has
noted, at low unemployment rates, “up-
ward pressures on wage costs are in-
evitable, short of a repeal of the law of
supply and demand.”
4
We’ve just seen that money wage
growth rises or falls depending on the
amount of slack in the labor market.
Chart 4 shows that real, or inflation-
adjusted, wage growth tracks growth 
in labor productivity. Faster productivity
growth means faster real wage growth.
In particular, the higher rates of pro-
ductivity growth since 1995 have been
accompanied by a marked acceleration
of real wages. The linkage isn’t perfect,
but it’s quite good. The linkage also
makes sense: firms ought to be willing
to pay workers more, in real terms, the
more productive they are.
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When Labor Market Is Tight
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Why has inflation not increased de-
spite tight labor markets? The key to the
mystery is rising productivity growth. As
shown in Chart 4, real wage growth—
the difference between money wage
growth and inflation—is closely tied to
growth in labor productivity:
Wage Growth – Price Growth =
Productivity Growth
Turning this relationship around, price
growth is linked to growth in unit labor
costs—the difference between wage
growth and productivity growth:
Price Growth = Wage Growth – Productivity Growth
(inflation) (growth in unit labor costs)
Hence, if productivity growth is rising
quickly enough, inflation can remain
steady or decline even if tight labor
markets are driving wage growth
higher. In other words, rising productiv-
ity growth can offset, or more than off-
set, the inflationary effects of tight labor
markets. That’s exactly what has hap-
pened over the past four years. Faster
growth in output and wages, a falling
unemployment rate and low inflation
have spelled good times for Joe Six-
pack and good times for central
bankers—all courtesy of the high-tech
productivity revolution.
However, if it is rising productivity
growth that has kept tight labor markets
from putting upward pressure on infla-
tion, policymakers have reason to be
wary. Productivity growth, even if it re-
mains high forever, cannot keep rising
forever. Once productivity growth stabi-
lizes, the buffer between tight labor
markets and inflation will disappear. In-
flation isn’t dead, merely sleeping—
awaiting the day when productivity
growth begins to level off.
Tough Policy Choices Ahead. It is
useful to run through some examples
that illustrate how the policy environ-
ment will change when productivity
growth stops rising. In each case, I 
assume the economy enjoys a five-year
period during which productivity growth
rises from 1.2 percent per year to 3.5
percent per year. This path mimics the
actual behavior of productivity growth
in the United States since 1995. Thus,
the 1.2 percent figure matches the rate
of nonfarm productivity growth in the
U.S. economy in 1995 (and the trend
rate of the early 1990s), while the 3.5
percent figure matches the rate stock
market investors expect during 2000.
5
Of course, real-world productivity
growth may rise above 3.5 percent. But
it can’t keep rising forever, and my illus-
trations all assume that 3.5 percent is the
limit. In each year from 2000 on, the av-
erage worker produces and earns 3.5 per-
cent more than the previous year—up
from a 1.2 percent annual increase in
1995. There’s no question that society in
general is much better off because of this
transition to a higher rate of productiv-
ity growth. People feel wealthier than
they did before—and justifiably so.
While productivity growth is rising,
life is rosy for Fed policymakers as well.
They can simultaneously deliver low
unemployment and steady inflation, as
illustrated in Chart 5. The unemploy-
ment path plotted in the chart repro-
duces the actual path seen in the United
States since 1995. Given assumed changes
in unemployment and productivity, pre-
dicted paths for output growth, wage
growth and inflation are generated
using the historical relationships dis-
played in Charts 3 and 4.
6 Note that
wage growth is predicted to more than
double over five years. Inflation remains
low. Output growth rises from 2.7 per-
cent in 1995 to 5 percent in 1999. On
the whole, the predicted patterns of
output growth, wage growth and infla-
tion pretty well approximate what
we’ve observed in the U.S. economy
over this period.
The exercise shown in Chart 5 makes
the Fed’s job look a lot simpler than it
was. Productivity-growth and inflation
trends don’t become obvious until well
after the fact. As a result, many econo-
mists, fearing that falling unemployment
and rapid output growth would lead to
higher inflation, wanted a tighter mone-
tary policy during the late 1990s. At 
the other extreme were analysts con-
cerned that, without a looser policy, we
might actually see runaway deflation.
Fortunately, those in the middle—“new-
paradigm optimists”—won the day.
Policymaking in the years ahead—as
productivity growth stabilizes—is going
to be even more difficult. I look at 
two extreme policy choices. The first
assumes the Fed tries to hold the un-
employment rate at its current level (4.1
percent). Results, shown in Chart 6, are
as follows. First, because the unem-
Chart 5
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Chart 6
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Chart 7


























SOURCES: Department of Labor; author’s calculations.ployment rate remains low, labor mar-
kets stay tight and wage inflation rises
indefinitely. Second, because rising pro-
ductivity growth no longer acts as a
buffer between wages and prices, price
inflation changes direction and begins
to follow wage inflation upward. Finally,
because the unemployment rate is no
longer falling, output growth slows a little.
A policy that implies ever-increasing
inflation is ultimately unsustainable, so
holding the unemployment rate down
permanently is not really an option. 
The point of Chart 6 is that the longer
you try to keep the unemployment rate
down, once productivity growth has
leveled off, the higher the inflation 
rate you’re ultimately going to be sad-
dled with.
At the opposite extreme from a pol-
icy that tries to hold down the unem-
ployment rate is a policy that holds
down the inflation rate. Chart 7 shows
the consequences that pursuing a hard-
line anti-inflation stance would have for
the labor market and output growth.
Because prices respond with a lag to
changes in productivity growth, holding
inflation down does not require that 
the unemployment rate return immedi-
ately to its long-run average level. Nev-
ertheless, the increase is fairly rapid.
Rising unemployment and steady pro-
ductivity growth are sufficient to halt
the acceleration of money wages, but
rising unemployment also means a 
period of sluggish output growth—a
“growth recession.”
7
In summary, the days of low unem-
ployment accompanied by low inflation
will be over once productivity growth
begins to level off. If we try to hold the
unemployment rate at an artificially low
level after this date, we can expect
wage pressures to begin spilling over to
prices. If we try to hold inflation down,
we can expect to experience a period
of slow output growth and rising un-
employment.
Know When to Hold Them, Know
When to Fold Them. How will policy-
makers know when it’s time to shift
gears? The conventional wisdom is that
low unemployment, rising wage growth,
rapid output growth and high stock val-
uations are all symptoms of an over-
heated economy. When we see several
of these symptoms at once—as we do
today—it’s a clear signal that we need
tighter monetary policy.
The conventional wisdom is at best 
a half-truth. The fact is, low unemploy-
ment and accelerating wages are per-
fectly consistent with a steady or even
declining inflation rate if productivity
growth is rising. Similarly, unusually
rapid output growth and historically
high stock market valuations may sim-
ply signal that trend productivity growth
is higher now than in the past. If low
unemployment, rapid wage and output
growth, and high stock valuations are
accompanied by high and rising pro-
ductivity growth, they are to be cele-
brated, not feared.
The implication is that the conven-
tional inflation indicators are of little use
unless you know what’s happening 
to productivity growth. Unfortunately,
available measures of productivity growth
bounce around a lot from quarter to
quarter and are subject to major revi-
sions. So, timely recognition of produc-
tivity trends is difficult.
It follows that the best place to look
for emerging inflation pressures is prob-
ably in the inflation statistics themselves.
That doesn’t necessarily mean waiting
for consumer price inflation to start ris-
ing. Changes in commodity prices may
give advance warning that retail price
increases are in the pipeline.
Conclusions
The good news is that productivity
growth has sped up, implying more
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  9
The Dynamics of Wage and Price Adjustment
The wage growth and inflation paths plotted in Charts 5, 6 and 7 are derived from the 
following wage and price adjustment equations, which were fitted to data for the nonfarm
business sector:
w(t) = .193p(t – 1) + .210p(t – 2) + .117p(t – 3) – .039p(t – 4) +
(.136) (.144) (.142) (.111)
.558w(t – 1) + .140w(t – 2) – .649w(t – 3) + .470w(t – 4) +
(.130) (.130) (.136) (.135)
.256q(t – 1) + .127q(t – 2) + .155q(t – 3) – .057q(t – 4) –
(.092) (.097) (.096) (.088)
.600[u(t – 1) – 5.991]
(.104) (.234)
Adjusted R
2 = .806 Standard error = 1.100
p(t) = .565p(t – 1) + .241p(t – 2) + .401p(t – 3) + .274p(t – 4) +
(.192) (.211) (.197) (.151)
.103w(t – 1) + .053w(t – 2) – .472w(t – 3) – .164w(t – 4) –
(.196) (.182) (.186) (.190)
.441q(t) + .191q(t – 1) + .242q(t – 2) + .341q(t – 3) + .148q(t – 4) –
(.078) (.143) (.149) (.140) (.126)
.470[u(t – 1) – 5.991] – 30.802[P(t – 1) + Q(t – 1) – W(t – 1) – 4.595]
(.147) (.234) (10.913) (.004)
Adjusted R
2 = .773 Standard error = 1.312
Here w, p and q are fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter wage, price and productivity growth,
respectively. The variables W, P and Q are the log levels of the wage rate, the price level and
output per hour. Finally, u is the fourth-quarter unemployment rate. The numbers in parenthe-
ses are standard errors. In estimating the equations, several restrictions were imposed.
(These restrictions are needed to preserve a stable long-run relationship between the price
level and unit labor costs.) In each equation, the coefficients of the lagged price-growth and
wage-growth terms were required to sum to 1. In the wage equation, the coefficients of the
lagged wage-growth and productivity-growth terms also were required to sum to 1. And in the
price equation, the coefficients of the lagged wage-growth terms were required to have the
same sum as the coefficients of current and lagged productivity-growth terms. The sample
period runs from 1960 through 1998.
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SWE SWE SWE Beyond the Border Beyond the Border
ARTICIPANTS IN LAST month’s
World Trade Organization meet-
ings in Seattle faced large and in-
tense demonstrations critical of
what many demonstrators saw
as the organization’s indifference
to environmental issues.
Environmentalists have long been
concerned over what they see as the
links between trade liberalization and
environmental danger. Some groups
argue that polluters that would never be
permitted to operate in developed
countries take their operations to more
compliant developing countries—just
as soon as developed countries drop
their trade barriers by enough to make
exporting back to these countries prof-
itable. According to this view, some de-
veloping countries are happy to get the
jobs and will tolerate the pollution. En-
vironmentalists sometimes refer to such
relocations and exporting as “environ-
mental dumping.”
This explanation is troubling, and
whether it is widespread enough to be
problematic or not, evidence suggests
that poor countries sometimes pollute
more as they grow. If this is how eco-
nomic development works when trade
liberalization takes place, it is easy to
see why so many demonstrators turned
out in the streets of Seattle.
The question is, Is this really how
economic growth, trade liberalization
and pollution interact? Research by
Princeton University professors Gene
Grossman and Alan Krueger offers a
perspective that is subtler and more
complicated and that raises questions
about the virtues of discouraging or
placing conditions on trade liberaliza-
tion.
As a background, it is useful to recall
that trade and trade liberalization spur
countries’ growth.
1 What complicates
the story is the relation between growth
and pollution. Grossman and Krueger’s
detailed picture of the connection be-
tween income per capita and air pollu-
tion in 42 countries and between in-
come per capita and water pollution in
58 countries suggests a complicated re-
lationship between growth in income
per capita and pollution.
2
The authors investigate whether pol-
lution typically increases with income
per capita, whether it sometimes in-
creases and sometimes declines, or
whether it always declines. Behind this
examination is the question of whether
or not, above a certain income per
capita, countries begin to treat clean air
and clean water like anything else they
want more of—that as countries grow
richer they will pay for laws and law
enforcement that will clean up their en-
vironment. The other question is, of
course, At what levels of income per
capita will countries start their cleanups?
Grossman and Krueger perform
econometric analyses on the connec-
tions between a nation’s income per
capita (among other variables) and the
incidence of sulfur dioxide and smoke
in the air and of lead, arsenic, nitrates,
fecal coliform bacteria and a host of
other contaminants in the water.
The results are rather different from
what might make some demonstrators
hit the streets. The authors find not only
that pollution does not invariably in-
crease with income per capita but that
there is typically a humpbacked rela-
tion. That is, pollution increases up to a
point and then falls as countries with 
incomes above that point take steps to
reduce a particular contaminant.
In the cases of sulfur dioxide and
smoke, for example, once a country’s
income reaches levels comparable with
Mexico’s and Malaysia’s, respectively,
the quantities of those contaminants
begin to fall. Other contaminants typi-
cally reach their peaks at lower incomes
per capita. Countries start doing some-
thing about lead in the water when they
reach an income per capita comparable
with Peru’s. Countries start to improve
the oxygen levels in water at about the
income per capita of Botswana. With
some contaminants, such as cadmium
and nitrates, income per capita levels
are relatively high before a country
does much. But in all cases, countries
begin pushing down pollution when
their incomes per capita grow to levels
well below that of the United States.
If free trade means growth, maybe
free trade is what environmentalists 
really want.
—William C. Gruben
Gruben is vice president and the director 
of the Center for Latin American Economics
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.   Notes
1 An excellent source of information is offered by Jeffrey Frankel and
David Romer in “Does Trade Cause Growth?” American Economic
Review 89, June 1999, pp. 379–99.
2 Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, “Economic Growth and the 
Environment,”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, May 1995, 
pp. 353–77.
Trade, WTO and the Environment
P
Pollution increases
up to a point and
then falls as 
countries with 
incomes above that




For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” ( Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
Dollars per barrel
Oil Price and Six-Month Futures Price
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1996 = 100
Texas Employment
Index, January 1998 = 100
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S DESCRIBED IN this issue’s cover story, the Texas
economy continued its long expansion in 1999, and
job growth is projected to increase slightly this year to
2.5 percent from 2.2 percent in 1999.
Because employment is the best of our timely
measures of the state’s economic performance, we
put much effort into getting the best estimate possible. As de-
scribed by Berger and Phillips in the July/August 1993 issue
of  Southwest Economy, we developed a unique seasonal 
adjustment procedure that incorporates early job estimates
that the Bureau of Labor Statistics later incorporates into its
annual revision.
As shown in the table, over the past four years, revisions to
our adjusted employment series have averaged only about 0.5
percent. On average, the forecasted growth rates have been
off by slightly less than 1 percentage point, and, excluding
1997, the average absolute error is only about 0.5 percent.
A
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI† Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
11/99 126.2 127.2 145.9 537.3 1,094.3 1,548.1 5,934.4 9,260.0 1,913.5 734.3
10/99 125.2 127.2 146.4 534.3 1,094.1 1,545.4 5,918.0 9,238.2 1,908.0 733.4
9/99 124.7 127.2 145.7 533.4 1,093.1 1,544.1 5,901.2 9,217.5 1,910.5 731.1
8/99 125.0 126.7 145.7 531.8 1,095.2 1,537.9 5,889.4 9,200.0 1,906.7 730.7
7/99 125.3 126.3 145.1 529.0 1,095.8 1,524.4 5,873.2 9,167.5 1,906.7 730.2
6/99 124.3 125.2 144.9 526.4 1,093.6 1,524.4 5,862.2 9,151.5 1,909.2 729.8
5/99 123.3 125.9 145.6 525.7 1,093.4 1,524.7 5,837.4 9,126.8 1,905.2 730.0
4/99 123.8 125.5 147.3 527.2 1,094.4 1,522.8 5,819.9 9,111.6 1,905.1 731.5
3/99 122.0 126.5 150.4 522.7 1,096.1 1,522.7 5,804.7 9,096.6 1,896.9 730.0
2/99 121.8 127.2 151.9 520.9 1,097.0 1,520.8 5,783.4 9,074.0 1,897.8 727.6
1/99 122.0 127.2 153.8 517.1 1,098.4 1,521.2 5,763.2 9,053.7 1,897.6 729.0
12/98 121.3 127.6 159.2 514.3 1,106.9 1,518.8 5,778.6 9,077.8 1,903.5 724.4
* in thousands
† Texas Industrial Production Index
 
Overall, this analysis shows that over the past four years
our forecasts of Texas job growth have been pretty accurate.
However, 1997’s stronger-than-expected national economy




Evaluation of Texas Job Growth Forecast
Forecast Actual Error Revision in previous
Year (percent) (percent) (percent) year’s growth rate
1996 2.4 3.1 –.7 –.3
1997 2.0 4.4 –2.4 .8
1998 3.0 3.6 –.6 .8
1999* 2.0 2.1 –.1 .3
Average absolute value .95 .55
Forecast data taken from past Southwest Economy articles.
* 1999 data are subject to further revision.
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rapid gains in living standards for
the average American and higher
real wages for workers.
Investors are counting on con-
tinued solid growth in productiv-
ity. Indeed, they are betting that
productivity growth will increase
further in the year ahead. In the
past, investors have done fairly
well at anticipating fluctuations in
productivity growth.
The bad news, from the per-
spective of the Federal Reserve, is
that even if productivity growth re-
mains rapid, policymaking is likely
to become more difficult. The ten-
sion between our desire for low
unemployment and our desire to
maintain low inflation will increase
in the years ahead.
—Evan F. Koenig
Koenig is vice president and senior
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas.
Notes
Ricardo Llaudes provided research assistance for this article.
1 For a brief, informal discussion of this point, see Paul Krug-
man, “Dow 36,000: A Self-Defeating Prophecy,” Fortune,
December 6, 1999, pp. 70–71. For an in-depth analysis,
see Richard W. Kopcke, “Are Stocks Overvalued?” Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston New England Economic Review,
September/October 1997, pp. 21–40.
2 As of January 14, 2000, Amazon.com’s market capitaliza-
tion was $21.9 billion, as compared with $1.52 billion for
Barnes & Noble. (Source: http://biz.yahoo.com)
3 The estimated forecasting equation is
q(t ) = 3.500 + .714R(t – 4) – 1.427p
e(t – 4) – .962l(t – 4) –
(.710) (.167) (.556) (.357)
.297e(t – 4) + .484 (t – 4) – 1.229δ (t – 4)
(.064) (.198) (.487)
Adjusted R
2 = .601 Standard error = .813
where q is the four-quarter growth rate of productivity in the
nonfarm business sector, R is the interest rate on A-rated
corporate bonds, p
e is the 10-year inflation expectation
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s survey of
professional forecasters, l is the four-quarter growth rate 
of the labor force, e is the four-quarter growth rate of non-
farm employment, and   and  δ are the earnings/price 
and dividends/price ratios for Standard & Poor’s 500. The
equation is estimated over a sample period that runs from
fourth quarter 1982 through third quarter 1999, with due 
allowance for a moving average error term. Standard errors
appear in parentheses.
4 Humphrey–Hawkins testimony before the House Commit-
tee on Banking and Financial Services, July 22, 1999.
5 More generally, the productivity growth rates I use in my 
examples equal the actual rates recorded in the nonfarm
business sector for 1995–98. I assume 3.3 percent pro-
ductivity growth in 1999 and 3.5 percent productivity
growth every year thereafter.
6 To generate the wage and price paths displayed in Chart 5,
the historical relationships shown in Charts 3 and 4 are
generalized to allow for more sophisticated dynamic inter-
actions. (See the box entitled “The Dynamics of Wage and
Price Adjustment.”) The output growth path is derived from
the assumed paths of productivity and unemployment using
Okun’s Law. See Arthur M. Okun, “Potential GNP: Its Mea-
surement and Significance,” in The Political Economy of
Prosperity, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution),
pp. 132–45.
7 Chart 7 should be treated with caution. It predicts fairly
sharp swings in output growth but takes the path of pro-
ductivity growth as given. In reality, swings in output
growth typically induce endogenous swings in productivity
growth in the same direction.
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